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I. INTRODUCTION
On the steps of the West Virginia State Capitol, President George W.
Bush addressed a crowd as follows on Independence Day, 2004: "[T]oday we
remember names like Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Franklin .... We're
thankful that this nation they created 228 years ago remains free and independ-
ent and the best hope for all mankind."' As President Bush was speaking, Jeff
Rank and his wife, Nicole, were handcuffed and asked to leave the event after
they refused to cover up their t-shirts which read: "Love America, Hate Bush,"
and "Regime change starts at home."2 The Ranks were charged with trespass
3because they refused to leave their spots and move to a designated protest area.
Although the Ranks had tickets to attend this event, a White House spokesman
commented that, as a general rule, official events for the President do not allow
the presence of "political signage." 4
Other recent events have also left the United States citizenry question-
ing to what extent we are allowed to express political protest on public property.
In Boston, Massachusetts, the site of the Democratic National Committee's
("DNC's") Convention for Presidential Candidate John Kerry, a twenty-five
foot wide caged zone surrounded by a twelve-foot fence was erected for protes-
tors of the convention, blocking them from the street where the convention was
held.5 The City of Boston claimed that the precautions were necessary to pro-
tect the delegates.6 In Rio Rancho, New Mexico, an event hosting Dick Cheney
required all those wishing to attend to sign a 'loyalty oath' to President George
W. Bush to enter the premises.7 This decision, made by the New Mexico GOP
Remarks on Independence Day in Charleston, West Virginia, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1202 (July 4, 2004).
2 Toby Coleman, T-Shirt Charges Dropped, Trespassing Charges Against Bush Protestors
Dismissed Since Code Doesn't Cover Statehouse Grounds, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, July 15,
2004, at IA; Free Speech? Critics Clobbered, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, July 9, 2004, at 4A [herein-
after Free Speech]. The criminal trespass charge was based on W. Va. Code § 61-3B-3(b), which
states that a trespass occurs if the offender defies an order to leave. W. VA. CODE § 61-3B-3(b)
(2003).
3 Free speech, supra note 2. The charges against the Ranks were later dropped, and the
Charleston City Council and Mayor Danny Jones issued a public apology to the couple. Couple
Arrested at Bush Rally Files Suit. Pair Seeks Change to Protest Policy, Monetary Damage for
Emotional Stress from July 4 Scene, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Sept. 15, 2004, at 5A.
4 Coleman, supra note 2, at IA. Note that the White House spokesman, Taylor Gross, also
stated that people attending the rally wearing pro-Bush items were similarly asked to cover up or
leave. Id.
5 Marie Szaniszlo, Convention Countdown; Groups Sue to Protest Closer to Fleet, BOSTON
HERALD, July 20, 2004, at 7.
6 Id.
7 Jim Belshaw, Loyalty Oath Not American, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, Aug. 1, 2004, at B 1.
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officials, was for the purpose of curbing demonstrations by anti-Bush activists at
the campaign event.8
Turbulent times and controversial issues, such as war, AIDS, abortion,
and civil rights, have historically encouraged the public to increase its activity of
protest in the public forum.9 There is no doubt that protesting has been more
prevalent in recent years for such reasons as the war in Iraq, the presidential
election, and gay rights issues. Just as owners of private property can control
their property's usage, the government is not required to give protestors unlim-
ited access to protest on public property in whichever manner the protestor so
chooses. 1° But to what extent can the government constitutionally limit a pro-
testor's right to passive, nonviolent expression on public property, particularly
where that property is a traditional public forum?" For fifty-five years, the U.S.
Supreme Court has attempted to set standards for the government to use when
regulating free speech and expression on public property.12 The resulting Public
Forum Doctrine has left courts across the nation unsure of what criteria govern,
and to what extent speech may be suppressed in a traditional public forum.
13
The following discussion provides insight into the Public Forum Doc-
trine and its role in American politics, both past and present. Part II of this Note
analyzes the history of the Public Forum Doctrine from its very beginnings to
the most recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. Part I outlines the mod-
em means of regulation, and gives insight through case law of challenges to
modern government regulation. Part IV then analyzes foreign precedent in an
effort to compile criteria for the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia to
use in potential future public forum cases coming before it, and concludes that
an audience member's right to passive expression in a traditional public forum
trumps any right of the political party organizer to exclude him or her from at-
tending.
8 'Loyalty Oaths' Not Required in West Virginia, THE CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Aug. 6,
2004, at 14A.
9 Kevin Francis O'Neill, Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45 Loy. L. REV. 411,413-
15 (1999).
10 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985) ("Even
protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times."); see also O'Neill, supra
note 9, at 419.
11 See O'Neill, supra note 9, at 419.
12 David A. Stoll, Public Forum Doctrine Crashes at Kennedy Airport, Injuring Nine: Interna-
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
A. Forming the Doctrine and Initial Developments
1. Davis v. Massachusetts
The first notable opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the
right of the state to limit public speech came by way of Justice White's opinion
in Davis v. Massachusetts.4 In Davis, the Court considered whether an ordi-
nance requiring a permit to engage in speech or expression on public property
was constitutional. 15 Davis had made a public address without first obtaining a
permit from the mayor, which was required by the ordinance. 16 The lower court
affirmed Davis's conviction, and stated that the legislature "may and does exer-
cise control over the use which the public may make of such places."' 7 On ap-
peal, Justice White defended the lower court's position that the state has control
over the use of public places by citizens. 18 Justice White contended that the
Constitution does not create a personal right in the citizenry of the state to use
the property of the state in a manner that is against the Legislature's wishes.
19
Thus, the original rule concerning use of public property was that state owner-
ship "entails unreviewable state power to control speech in public places.,
20
Justice White's opinion displayed the Supreme Court's view that free speech did
not supersede the property rights of the state, and it would be forty years before
a decision would modify this notion.2'
2. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization
The Davis decision of absolute government control over public fora
lasted until the Supreme Court decided Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org.22 The
Hague opinion, rendered over forty years after Davis, marked the emergence of
14 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
15 Id. at 47.
16 Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895).
17 Id. Justice Holmes, author of the lower court opinion, stated that for "the Legislature abso-
lutely... to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the
rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house."
Id.
18 Davis, 167 U.S. at 46-47.
19 Id. at 47-48.
20 Lillian R. Bevier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories, 1992
Sup. CT. REv. 79, 82.
21 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V. TusHNET, FIRST
AMENDMENT 286-87 (1999) [hereinafter FIRST AMENDMENT].
22 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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the Public Forum Doctrine.23 In Hague, the plaintiff challenged a municipal
ordinance forbidding all public meetings in streets and other public places with-
out first obtaining a permit.24 In an opinion authored by Justice Roberts, the
Supreme Court held that the right to gather in public and speak to one another is
a privilege inherent in United States citizenship, and is protected under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 25 Although the facts were analogous to those in Davis v.
Massachusetts, the Court's holding was not.26 Justice Roberts held that the or-
dinance was facially void, and he explained the reason in dictum:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have im-
memorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for the purposes of assembly,
communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has ...
been part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
citizens. The privilege of a citizen to ... use the streets and
parks for communication... may be regulated in the interest of
all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised ... in
consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the
guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.27
Justice Roberts's reasoning infers that a state may regulate a citizen's
right to speak in a public forum to maintain order, but his opinion recognizes
that a state cannot regulate to the extent that it completely or arbitrarily bars
access to such a forum.28 Unlike Justice White in Davis, Justice Roberts used a
privileges and immunities clause analysis. 29 The Hague opinion distinguished
the ordinance in Davis because "it was not directed solely at the exercise of the
right of speech and assembly, but was addressed.., to other activities.., which
doubtless might be regulated or prohibited as respects their enjoyment in
parks. 3° Justice Roberts's opinion in Hague articulating the "immemorially...
time out of mind" characterization of property is a central feature of the Public
Forum Doctrine.3 1 Courts have stricken numerous ordinances based on such
23 Richard T. Pfohl, Hague v. CIO and the Roots of Public Forum Doctrine: Translating Lim-
its of Powers into Individual Rights, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 533, 539 (1993).
24 Hague, 307 U.S. at 496.
25 Id. at 512.
26 Id. at 514-18.
27 Id. at 515-16.
28 See id.
29 Id. at 515.
30 Id.
31 See id.; see also Pfohl, supra note 23, at 566.
2005]
5
Rounds: Protecting West Virginia's Public FORA: Criteria to Safeguard Our
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
principles. 32 Not once in Justice Roberts's opinion in Hague is there any men-
tion of the First Amendment. 33 Courts have also combined Justice Stone's con-
currence in Hague (using a due process rationale) with Justice Roberts's plural-
ity opinion to produce the modem Public Forum Doctrine.3 n
The Hague plurality opinion also fails to mention where the idea of the
public forum originated, whether it be from the Constitution, or a result of his-
torical customs. 35 Justice Roberts also failed to suggest criteria to use when
applying the Public Forum Doctrine in future cases.36 While no criteria were
specifically enumerated, Justice Robert's opinion does rest on an application of
a reasonableness analysis.37 With the opinion in Hague, Justice Roberts put to
rest the idea that municipalities could keep public fora clear of influence from
potentially unsettling ideas.38
3. Schneider v. State
The same year that the Supreme Court decided Hague, the Court ren-
dered another important decision concerning speech in a public forum. In
Schneider v. State, the Supreme Court considered whether an ordinance forbid-
ding distribution of handbills to passers-by upon the public streets of Los Ange-
les was a reasonable exercise of police power by the state.39 The City argued
that it had a legitimate interest in protecting the City and its people from such
distribution because the ordinance prevented littering.40 The Court rejected the
City's proposed legitimate interest.41 Writing for the Court again, Justice Rob-
erts held that "cleanliness of the streets does not justify an exertion of the police
power which invades the free communication of information and opinion se-
cured by the Constitution.A 2 The Court acknowledged that courts have the dif-
ficult task of "[weighing] the circumstances and... [appraising] the substantial-
ity of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation," but a legislative pref-
erence may "be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights
32 See Pfohl, supra note 23, at 566 n.190.
33 Id. at 564.
34 Id. at 561.
35 Bevier, supra note 20, at 83.
36 Id.
37 Pfohl, supra note 23, at 560.
38 MARGARET A. BLANCHARD, REVOLUTIONARY SPARKS 168 (1992).
39 308 U.S. 147, 153-55 (1939).
40 Id. at 162.
41 Id. at 161. Regarding the purported governmental interest, Justice Roberts stated: "Mere
legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regu-
lation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the
exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions." Id.
42 Id. at 163.
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so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. 4 3 Despite the City's
legitimate interest in keeping the streets open for movement and in maintaining
the well-being of its citizens, the Court struck down the ordinance as an
abridgement of First Amendment free speech liberties. 44 Ultimately, the opin-
ions in both Hague and Schneider afforded more protection to people to com-
municate openly in public fora.45
B. Advancing Towards Inconsistency: The Last Thirty Years of Public Fo-
rum Analysis
1. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights
In the last three decades, the Supreme Court has issued fragmented
46opinions in public forum cases. In 1974, the Supreme Court decided the case
of Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, where a political candidate brought action
against the City for refusing him space on the side of a public bus to post cam-
paign ads.47 The City had denied him permission because it wished to minimize
opportunities for abuse, lessen the appearance of favoritism, and eliminate the
risk of having a captive audience to political advertising.48 The Court agreed
with the City of Shaker Heights that a public bus was not a public forum, and
thus the ordinance prohibiting the displays was not a First Amendment viola-
tion.49 Justice Blackmun authored the Court's plurality opinion, and stated that
because there were no open spaces, parks, or "other public thoroughfare," the
Constitution did not afford to the petitioner the right sought.50  The plurality
opinion "sounded the death knell" for the right to broad public forum access. 1
The dissenters made strong arguments that illuminate the plurality's in-
consistency when analogized with parallel preceding cases. Justice Brennan's
43 Id. at 161.
44 See Jonathan Janiszewski, Silence Enfotced Through Speech: Philadelphia and the 2000
Republican National Convention, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 121, 127 (2002).
45 See generally Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
46 See infra notes 47-98 and accompanying text.
47 418 U.S. 298, 299 (1974).
48 Id. at 304.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 303.
51 Bevier, supra note 20, at 89. Bevier explains that "[b]efore Lehman, it seemed that the
'public forum' would become an expansive concept: the Court seemed on the verge of holding...
that citizens may always speak in a public forum unless the Court independently agreed with the
judgment of the forum managers." Id. (emphasis added). The opinion in Lehman did not provide
"an additional brake on governmental restriction of speech," but instead, "Justice Blackmun's
approach makes mandatory access a threshold test for protection." Id. (citing Ronald A. Cass,
First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REv. 1287, 1301 (1979)).
2005]
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dissent relied on Hague to clarify that identifying a place as a public forum re-
quires "the Court to strike a balance between the competing interests of the gov-
ernment ... and the speaker and [the] audience. ,52 After he declared that a
public bus is a public forum, Justice Brennan stated that free speech and equal
protection principles prohibit discrimination when the regulation is content-
based.53 After Lehman, the public forum label became a way to restrict First
Amendment access rights, and Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion offered no
explanation as to why car cards on public transportation vehicles were not pub-
lic forums.54
2. U.S. v. Grace
Nearly a decade after Lehman, a less-fragmented Court issued a deci-
sion in favor of First Amendment public forum rights. In United States v.
Grace, Justice White wrote for the seven-to-two majority in a case that hit close
to home for the Court; the section of the statute in question prohibited the "dis-
play [of] any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public
notice any part, organization, or movement" in or on the grounds of the U.S.
Supreme Court building. 55 In striking down the statute as unconstitutional, Jus-
tice White disagreed with the United States that because the public had not tra-
ditionally used it for expressive purposes, the sidewalk outside the Supreme
Court building was a nonpublic forum.56
Writing for the majority, Justice White opined that "Congress ... may
not by its own ipse dixit destroy the 'public forum' status of streets and parks
which have historically been public forums, 57 and a sidewalk in front of the
Supreme Court building deserves the same public forum status as any other
sidewalk in Washington D.C. or elsewhere.58 While Justice White contended
that the government may impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions,
the Court found that the statute was not a reasonable place restriction because it
had an "insufficient nexus" with any public interest that might be thought to
"undergird" the statute in question.59 The majority's emphasis that a public fo-
52 Lehman, 418 U.S. at 312.
53 Id. at 315.
54 Bevier, supra note 20, at 89.
55 461 U.S. 171, 172-73 (1983).
56 Id. at 174, 179-80.
57 Id. at 180 (quoting United Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 133
(1981)). Justice White uses the United Postal Service opinion to further support the notion that
including a public sidewalk in the statute in question in Grace demotes its public forum status,
which is "presumptively impermissible." Id.
58 Id. at 179.
59 Id. at 181. Justice White further clarified that an "insufficient nexus" is one that "does not
sufficiently serve those public interests that are urged as its justification." Id. In this case, the
stated purpose of the act was to protect the building and grounds, and to maintain proper order and
[Vol. 108
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rum cannot, without sufficient justification, be demoted by a statute or ordi-
nance to a nonpublic status is one of the most significant aspects of the Grace
decision.6°
3. Boos v. Barry
While Grace re-emphasized the right to freedom of expression in a pub-
lic forum, another sidewalk case decided shortly after Grace provided insight
into the level of scrutiny the Supreme Court applies when an ordinance limits
expression in the public forum. 6' In Boos v. Barry, the Court examined a con-
tent-based D.C. Code Section that prohibited the display of certain signs within
five hundred feet of a foreign embassy to determine if this prohibition violated
expression rights in a public forum.62 Justice O'Connor authored the Court's
majority opinion, and stated that if a statute is a content-based restriction on
political speech in a public forum, "[it] must be subjected to the most exacting
,,63scrutiny. The government asserted that it had a dignity interest for foreign
diplomatic personnel, but the Supreme Court found that the code section in
question was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest and therefore violated
the First Amendment. 64
4. U.S. v. Kokinda
After Boos and Grace, it seemed that the Supreme Court was providing
ammunition for the public forum as an open area for expressive communication,
and that the analysis used in the prior Lehman holding restricting access rights
was vanishing. 65 Then came U.S. v. Kokinda, where the plurality opinion con-
cluded that a regulation prohibiting activity such as campaigning, commercial
soliciting, and displaying or distributing commercial advertising from postal
decorum. Id. at 182. Despite its recognition that this was an important objective, the Court found
that because the perimeter of the building was indistinguishable from any other sidewalk, a total
ban on the conduct usually allowed on other public sidewalks was unjustifiable. Id.
60 See O'Neill, supra note 9, at 459.
61 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); cf. Grace, 461 U.S. at 179-81.
62 Boos, 485 U.S. at 315. The section of the statute included in the above text is referred to by
the Supreme Court as the "display clause" portion of the statute. Id. at 316. The "display clause"
only prohibited the signs if they tended to bring that foreign government they were directed at into
"public odium" or "public disrepute." Id. The other portion of the statute which prohibits any
congregation of three or more persons within 500 feet of the embassy (referred to as the "congre-
gation clause" by the Supreme Court), is not mentioned in this analysis. Id.
63 Id. at 321.
64 Id. at 322-29. Note that regarding the "congregation clause," discussed infra note 69, the
Court held that it was a constitutional time, place, and manner restriction because it was site-
specific and was limited to groups posing a security threat. Id. at 331-32.
65 See supra notes 46-64 and accompanying text (discussing Lehman, Boos, and Grace).
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property was not a First Amendment violation.66 Justice O'Connor, relying
heavily on Lehman, stated that the postal sidewalk did not have the characteris-
tics of the traditional public sidewalk open to free expression and was con-
structed solely to help post office patrons access the post office. 67 Because the
plurality did not identify the area as a traditional public forum, and because the
regulation was not content-based, the plurality applied a reasonableness test and
upheld the regulation.68
The dissenters in Kokinda were confused as to why the Court seemingly
ignored its opinion in Grace.69 Writing for the dissent, Justice Brennan stated
that over the years, the Court has categorized three areas where expression may
occur on public property: "(1) traditional... 'places which by long tradition...
have been devoted to assembly and debate' . . . ; (2) 'limited-purpose' . . . fo-
rums opened 'for use by the public as a place for expressive activity' ... ; and
(3) nonpublic forums or public property 'which... [are] not by tradition... a
forum for public communication.' 70 Justice Brennan questioned the Court's
interpretation of a public forum, which he stated has seemed to restrict freedom
of expression rather than protect it.71 Using a common sense approach and rely-
ing on Grace, Justice Brennan declared that a public sidewalk next to a public
office where people are free to enter and exit is a natural choice for speech and
expression to take place, and "[n]o doctrinal pigeonholding, complex formula,
or multipart test can obscure this evident conclusion. 72
The holding in Kokinda reverted back to the Lehman-way of reasoning
and provided just as little explanation as to why the space outside of a U.S. post
office was a nonpublic forum. 73 The interest proposed by the government, that
the solicitation was disruptive of business, was enough to pass the plurality's
reasonableness test applied to nonpublic fora.74 While the Public Forum Doc-
trine was over fifty years old at the time of Kokinda, the holdings up through
and including Kokinda left the public forum as a vague, undefinable concept.
75
66 497 U.S. 720, 723-24, 737 (1990).
67 Id. at 727-28.
68 Id. at 736-37.
69 See id. at 740 (5-4 decision) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 740-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)).
71 /d. at 741 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 742-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73 See Bevier, supra note 20, at 95-96.
74 Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730, 736-37; see also FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 21, at 303.
75 See Bevier, supra note 20, at 95-96.
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C. Where the U.S. Supreme Court Has Left Us: ISKCON v. Lee
In 1992, the Supreme Court rendered its most recent decision affecting
the Public Forum Doctrine. In ISKCON v. Lee, the Court was confronted with
two issues: first, whether an airport terminal was a public forum, and second,
whether it was within the public authority's right to regulate solicitation.76 The
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. ("ISKCON") alleged that
the Port Authority ban on solicitation deprived members of First Amendment
rights. 7 After finding that an airport terminal is not a public forum, the Court
upheld the solicitation ban.78
The Court's public forum analysis included a significant classification
system, dividing public property into three categories: traditional public fora,
designated public fora, and nonpublic fora.79 In its majority opinion, authored
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court described each category as follows: tradi-
tional public fora are property that have "traditionally been available for public
expression," that designated public fora are "property that the State has opened
for expressive activity by part or all of the public," and the remaining property is
nonpublic fora. 80 Because an airport terminal has not "immemorially ... time
out of mind" been used by the public for expressive purposes and because using
terminals for expression is new, the majority held that an airport terminal falls
into the nonpublic category and is not a public forum.81
76 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 674 (1992).
Note that there was also a regulation of sale and distribution in the airport terminals, which is
addressed in Lee v. ISKCON, 505 U.S. 830 (1992). The focus of this discussion, however, con-
cerns the solicitation ban decision.
The regulation in place by the public authority forbid "the repetitive solicitation of money or
distribution of literature," "the sale or distribution of any merchandise," and "the sale or distribu-
tion of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, books, or any other printed or written materials." ISKCON,
505 U.S. at 675-76. The regulations only pertained to the terminals; solicitation and distribution
on the outside sidewalks was not within the scope of the regulation. Id. at 676.
77 Id. at 676. ISKCON specifically alleged that, under the regulation, it was unable to perform
"sankirtan," described by the court as a ritual of "going into public places, disseminating religious
literature and soliciting funds to support religion." Id. at 674-75.
78 Id. at 679 ("[W]e conclude that the terminals are nonpublic fora and that the regulation
reasonably limits solicitation."). Regarding the ban on the sale and distribution of literature, the
Court found that the ban violated the First Amendment. Lee v. ISKCON, 505 U.S. 830, 831
(1992).
79 ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678-79; see also U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 740-41 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (similarly classifying public property).
80 ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678-79. The category of traditional public fora includes sidewalks,
streets, and parks. Id.
81 Id. at 680. Chief Justice Rehnquist opines that:
[Tihe tradition of airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically been made
available for speech activity. Nor can we say that these particular terminals ... have been inten-
tionally opened ... to such activity .... In short, there can be no argument that society's time-
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According to the majority, when property falls in the nonpublic fora
category it receives a relaxed scrutiny, and the government's role is then the
most analogous to a private property owner.82 The Court states that for a regula-
tion over nonpublic fora to pass, it only needs to be reasonable, as long as the
government is not regulating based on a favored or disfavored viewpoint.83
Under this standard, as long as property fits into the nonpublic category, there is
little to no First Amendment analysis, even if more reasonable alternatives ex-
ist.
84
Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy each authored significant con-
currences in this case.85 Justice O'Connor agreed that airport terminals are not
public fora for many of the same reasons enumerated by the majority. 86 How-
ever, Justice O'Connor went further and cautioned that this does not give the
government the right to "restrict speech in whatever way it likes. 87 Justice
O'Connor proceeded to go through a reasonableness analysis, but with a com-
patibility twist - she stated that a reasonable regulation must also be consistent
with a legitimate government interest to maintain the property for its lawfully
intended use.88 According to Justice O'Connor, the correct reasonableness in-
quiry was "whether [the speech restrictions] are reasonably related to maintain-
ing a multipurpose environment that the Port Authority has deliberately cre-
ated. 89
Justice Kennedy's concurrence accused the majority of a flawed analy-
sis by leaving the government "with almost unlimited authority to restrict
speech on its property by doing nothing more than articulating a non-speech-
tested judgment, expressed through acquiescence in a continuing practice, has resolved the issue
in petitioners' favor.
Id. at 680-81.
82 Id. at 678-79; O'Neill, supra note 9, at 423-24.
83 ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 679.
84 Stoll, supra note 12, at 1304. Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach involves an intent-based
inquiry, asking whether the government intended for the forum to be fully open for expressive
purposes. Id. at 1302. If the answer is no, then the property is nonpublic fora, and the regulation
need only be reasonable, despite adverse affects on expressive activities. See id. at 1302-03.
85 While the Court's opinion on the solicitation regulation, ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992), and the sale and distribution regulation, Lee v. ISKCON, 505 U.S. 830 (1992), were is-
sued separately, Justice O'Connor's concurrence and Justice Kennedy's concurrence, along with
Justice Souter's dissent, are contained in a separate opinion under the same citation as ISKCON v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992), but these opinions discuss each of the Court's opinions regarding the
solicitation ban and the sale and distribution ban.
86 ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 686-87.
87 Id. at 687.
88 Id. at 688.
89 Id. at 689. The "multipurpose environment" that Justice O'Connor refers to includes the
shopping mall atmosphere in the terminal, including but not limited to restaurants, barber shops,
food stores, and banks. Id. at 687-89.
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related purpose for the area . . . ."90 Justice Kennedy further included a com-
patibility element, stating that the inquiry into whether property is a public fo-
rum should include the "actual, physical characteristics and uses of the prop-
erty."91 The Court, according to Justice Kennedy, is indirectly holding that tra-
ditional public fora are a closed category of streets, parks, and sidewalks, and
the Court is foreclosing any property with similar characteristics (such as airport
terminals) from joining.92 Overall, Justice Kennedy's trepidation lies in the
excessive authority the majority leaves the government, the lack of room for
new additions to the traditional public forum list, and the majority's narrow
view of Public Forum Doctrine purposes.93
The opinions in ISKCON v. Lee leave no clear articulation of a test or
criteria for courts to apply when determining if a space is a public forum. 94 The
Court gives no indication of what extent First Amendment privileges should be
factored into a court's analysis. 95 Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy urge
the Court not to allow too much governmental authority and to consider com-
patibility when property has not traditionally been held as a public forum.
9 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist alternatively states that if the property is nonpublic fora,
all that is required is a reasonable regulation free from viewpoint discrimina-
tion.97 Despite concerns surrounding the outcome of ISKCON v. Lee, the major-
ity's categorical approach is where the Court has left us, leaving much trust in
governmental authority, and leaving some justified concern as to the signifi-
cance of First Amendment considerations in public forum analysis. 98
90 Id. at 695.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 694-96. Justice Kennedy states that when constitutional time, place and manner re-
strictions are in place to govern fora, such as airport terminals, the expressive activity is compati-
ble with the other major uses of the airport. Id. at 701. This is analogous to Justice O'Connor's
description of compatibility in her concurrence. See id. at 687-89.
93 See Bevier, supra note 20, at 98-99.
94 Id. at 100. Bevier outlines four main reasons why this is so:
First, it is unclear whether the categorical approach to the question of whether
particular public property is a public forum retains vitality. Second, if it does,
it is unclear what test the Court will use to determine whether particular prop-
erty should be categorized as a traditional public forum ... Third, if the cate-
gorical approach survives, will the Court adopt a sliding scale of judicial scru-
tiny ... or will it move toward ... [a] preference for a more activist judicial
review? Finally, will the Court eschew the categorical approach completely
and embrace... [a] case-by-case analysis instead?
Id.
95 Id.
96 See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 686-709.
97 Id. at 678-79.
98 See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 672-709; see also Bevier, supra note 20, at 113-21; FIRST
AMENDMENT, supra note 21, at 303-06.
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III. MODERN MEANS OF REGULATING SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC FORUM
The First Amendment guarantees the right to free speech and expres-
sion, but governments are still allowed to regulate assemblies and expression
through time, place, and manner restrictions in public places. 99 The most fa-
vored method of control over assemblies is to require those seeking to assemble
to obtain licenses or permits.' °° Such systems requiring permits and licenses
have been challenged over time as a violation of our right to expression by im-
posing a financial burden, and by leaving too much power in the hands of the
authority issuing the license or permit.
A. The Basics of Permitting Systems: Licenses and Fees
Most jurisdictions have similar licensing and permitting systems in
place. 101 Typically, the speaker or organizer must pay a nominal fee to the li-
censor or licensing board in order to secure the permit.102 Although there are
prior restraint concerns10 3 with such permit systems, the courts have upheld such
schemes as constitutional as long as certain criteria are met. '04
There are legitimate concerns that permit systems may threaten First
Amendment guarantees, 0 5 yet endless disputes will never resolve whether regu-
lations imposed by the government are reasonable.1' 6 States have the police
power to regulate public areas, particularly streets, so that the area may function
both as a place for traffic and as a place for expression or expressive demonstra-
99 Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 ("[T]he government may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations" in public places associated with "the free exercise of expressive activities, such as
streets, sidewalks, and parks."); see also Janiszewski, supra note 44, at 128.
100 O'Neill, supra note 9, at 463.
101 See id.
102 Id. at 464. The license and permitting schemes described above apply only to demonstra-
tions, parades, and similar events or processions. Hand-billing and door-to-door canvassing can-
not be licensed by the government. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of
Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165-169 (2002) (stating that for fifty years the Court has invalidated re-
strictions on door-to-door solicitation and pamphleteering, and ultimately holding that requiring a
permit for such activity is incompatible with First Amendment requirements).
103 For an in-depth discussion of such prior restraint concerns, see FIRST AMENDMENT, supra
note 21, at 116-25 and Janiszewski, supra note 44, at 124-26.
104 Janiszewski, supra note 44, at 131-32; see also infra Part III.C. (outlining the specific crite-
ria to determine if a permitting scheme passes constitutional muster as set forth by Justice Black-
mun in the Forsyth opinion).
105 C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place,
and Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 1013-18 (1983). Baker states that there are
three categories of costs that may result from licensing schemes: (1) Permits make a valuable,
passive type of expression unlawful; (2) The permit scheme requires the assemblers to succumb to
the same authority that it is challenging; and (3) The licensor uses its authority to issue licenses as
a means to harass the permittees. Id.
106 Id. at 1000.
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tions. 107 It may be argued that permitting systems should not work to suppress
or undermine expression in a public forum. 0 8 In contrast to this argument, it
may also be argued that the primary purpose of a public forum, such as a street
or sidewalk, is traffic flow, whether by car or on foot."°9 Despite this counter
argument, prior decisions such as Hague have dedicated places like streets and
sidewalks as places of expression, supporting the notion that the government
cannot regulate such areas through permitting when the property is traditionally
a place of expression.'°
There are generally two inquiries to see if a licensing scheme is consti-
tutional: first, a court considers the degree of discretion given to the licensing
official(s), and second, the court considers the extent that the fee may bar or
deter a speaker from speaking. 11 Typically, the fees set by the government are
constitutional if there is a direct link with administrative expenses that the gov-
ernment will encounter as a result of regulating the speakers assembly or activ-
ity. 112 The cases and analyses that follow demonstrate a history of challenges to
permitting systems, wherein some governmental authorities have exceeded their
right to exercise police power in public fora.
B. A Case Law Explanation of the Effects of Permitting
Three seminal cases concerning permitting are: Lovell v. City of Grif-
fin,'"3 Cox v. New Hampshire,'"4 and Murdock v. Pennsylvania.115 All three
occurred within a six-year span, and laid the groundwork for permit analysis."
6
In Lovell v. City of Griffin, an ordinance was challenged that required written
permission from the City Manager in order to distribute literature anywhere
within the City limits." 7 In holding that this broad permitting system was un-
constitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the system "strikes at the very
107 Id. at 1004. The issue noted by Baker is whether the government should be allowed to
provide for transportation in a manner that limits the expressive use of the street. Id.
108 Id. at 1006.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1007.
III O'Neill, supra note 9, at 463-64.
112 Id. at 467-68.
13 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
114 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
"5 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
116 O'Neill, supra note 9, at 463-74; Pfohl, supra note 23, at n.23 (referring to the impact of
Hague's citation to Lovell). See also FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 21, at 294-96; Janiszewski,
supra note 44, at 128-30.
117 Lovell, 303 U.S. at 447. Violation of this ordinance was considered a "nuisance, and [was]
punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin." Id. The appellant was convicted after fail-
ing to apply for the permit, for distributing religious material. Id. at 447-48.
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foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censor-
ship."' 
18
A few years later, the Court considered another permitting system chal-
lenge, but this time the system regulated assemblies in public streets.' 19 In Cox
v. N.H., a statutory prohibition was challenged that prohibited parades or pro-
cessions on public streets without first obtaining a special license from "the se-
lectmen of the town, or from a licensing committee for cities hereinafter pro-
vided for."' 20  Appellants, who had passively marched single file down the
sidewalk without acquiring the permit, were charged with taking part in a pro-
cession on public streets without the required permit.' 2' In upholding the per-
mitting scheme, the Court stated that the central question was whether the gov-
ernmental control was exercised in a way that did not deny or abridge the com-
munication and assembly opportunities of the appellants in the public forum.
1 22
The government's asserted purpose, that it needed advance notice to properly
police the assembly, was legitimate to the Court, and the Court stated that as
long as a system is "free from improper or inappropriate considerations and
from unfair discrimination," it is legitimate.1 23 The Court also found that the fee
system in place, ranging from "$300 to a nominal amount," was constitutional,
and that local governments could give themselves flexibility in their fee sched-
ules. 
24
Shortly after Cox, the Court more closely considered a fee arrangement
that required people to pay a licensing tax before pursuing expressive activi-
ties. 25 In Murdock v. Pa., petitioners wished to distribute religious materials
without first obtaining a license to do so.' 26 The ordinance had required that, in
order for persons to canvass for or solicit anywhere within the Borough, a li-
cense must first be obtained by paying the required fee. 127 The Court invali-
dated this permitting system because the State was imposing a charge on privi-
118 Id. at 451. Chief Justice Hughes, who delivered the Court's opinion, stated, "Legislation of
the type of the ordinance in question would restore the system of license and censorship in its
baldest form" because the ordinance prohibited all materials, at any time, place, and manner,
without the City Manager's permission. Id. at 451-52.
19 Cox, 312 U.S. at 570-71.
120 Id. at 571 (citing N.H. P. L., ch. 145, § 2 (1926)).
121 Id. at 573.
122 Id. at 574.
123 Id. at 576.
124 Id. at 576-77.
125 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106.
126 Id. at 106-07.
127 Id. at 106. The fee system, outlined in the ordinance was: $1.50 for one day, $7.00 for one
week, $12.00 for two weeks, and $20.00 for three weeks. Id. The petitioners were selling books
for twenty-five cents each and pamphlets for five cents each, yet they sold the books and pam-
phlets for cheaper and even occasionally donated them. Id. at 106-07.
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leges guaranteed by the First Amendment. 128 The Court stated that "[i]t is not a
nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing
the activities in question.... It is a flat license tax levied and collected as a con-
dition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the First
Amendment." 129 The tension resulting from the decisions of Cox and Murdock
would be resolved through a later case.
130
Following the three aforementioned cases, another case also contributed
to the opinions concerning permitting systems. 31 In Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham,132 an ordinance for the City of Birmingham was challenged as
unlawful because it required the commission to issue a permit in order for a
permittee to hold a public demonstration on the streets or other public ways.
133
The demonstrator in Shuttlesworth challenged the ordinance, which was de-
clared invalid by the Court. 134 The Court stated that it "[has] consistently con-
demned licensing systems which vest in an administrative official discretion to
grant or withhold a permit upon broad criteria unrelated to proper regulation of
public places."'' 35 The Court cautioned officials who use their own opinions to
grant or withhold permits. 136 In lieu of the surrounding relevant circumstances,
the Court in Shuttlesworth found that the officials had abused their power and
acted under their personal beliefs. 1
37
C. The Four Criteria of Forsyth
The central case outlining the modem criteria for evaluating licensing
systems is Forsyth County, GA v. Nationalist Movement.' 38 In Forsyth, a parade
128 Id. at 113.
129 Id. at 113-14.
130 See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
131 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 149 (citing BIRMINGHAM, ALA., CODE § 1159 (1944)). The ordinance required written
permission from the commission prescribing what streets or other public ways may be used. Id.
134 Id. at 158-59. Shuttlesworth was permitted to challenge the ordinance because his convic-
tion was for marching without a permit. Id. at 150. In another case stemming from the same
event, Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), the demonstrators were not allowed to
challenge the validity of the same ordinance because the Walker demonstrators were charged with
contempt of an injunction. See Walker, 388 U.S. at 311-12.
135 Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 153 (citing Kunz v. N.Y., 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951)).
136 Id. at 153-59.
137 Id. The surrounding circumstances in both the records of Shuttlesworth and Walker showed
that several times the Civil Rights demonstrators had attempted to obtain permits from Commis-
sioner Connor, who, at one point, replied: "No, you will not get a permit in Birmingham, Alabama
to picket. I will picket you over to the City Jail." Walker, 388 U.S. at 317; Shuttlesworth, 394
U.S. at 157-58.
138 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
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ordinance was challenged for allowing a government administrator to vary the
fee for assembling. 139 According to the ordinance, the fee was varied for each
applicant to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining public order.140 The ordi-
nance in question provided that to secure a permit, a permittee must pay "a sum
of not more than $1,000.00 for each day such parade, procession, or open air
public meeting shall take place."' 141 In a 5-4 decision, the majority struck down
the ordinance as unconstitutional.
142
To reach its conclusion, the majority used four criteria to determine if a
permitting scheme is constitutional.143 The first is whether the scheme leaves
the licensing official with too much discretion.144 Writing for the Court, Justice
Blackmun declares that, "[t]he First Amendment prohibits the vesting of such
unbridled discretion in a government official," and that the Forsyth Ordinance
leaves the official with the ability to set a fee without relying on objective fac-
tors and without giving an explanation. 145 Secondly, the Court directed that the
permitting scheme cannot be content-based. 146 In this case, the administrator
issuing the permits had to "examine the content of the message that is con-
veyed" in order to "assess accurately the cost of security for parade partici-
pants." 147 The third criterion for a constitutional permit scheme is that it be nar-
rowly drawn to serve a legitimate governmental interest. 48 After considering
the administrator's explanation of prior fees imposed, and after considering the
county's implementation of the ordinance, Justice Blackmun stated that the
standards used by Forsyth were not narrowly drawn, reasonable, or definite.
49
The fourth and final criterion in Forsyth examines whether the ordinance setting
up the scheme leaves open ample alternatives for communication. 50 Firiding
139 Id. at 124.
140 Id. Two demonstrations led to the passage of the ordinance. The first demonstration was a
"March Against Fear and Intimidation" led by a city councilman, which turned violent and ended
prematurely when counterdemonstrators threw bottles and rocks. Id. at 125. A follow-up demon-
stration the next weekend resulted in the largest civil rights demonstration in the South since the
Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. It cost $670,000 for police protection and Forsyth County
had to pay part of the cost. Id.
141 Id. at 126 (citing Forsyth County, Ga., Ordinance 34 (Jan. 27, 1987)).
142 Id. at 137.
143 See id. at 130; Janiszewski, supra note 44, at 131.
144 Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 130.
145 Id. at 133.
146 Id. at 130; Janiszewski, supra note 44, at 131.
147 Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 134. The Court further states that "[t]he fee assessed will depend on
the administrator's measure of the amount of hostility likely to be created by the speech based on
its content," which could mean that "[t]hose wishing to express views unpopular with bottle
throwers. .. may have to pay more for their permit." Id.
148 See id. at 130; Janiszewski, supra note 44, at 131.
149 Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 132-33.
15o See id. at 130; Janiszewski, supra note 44, at 131.
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that the ordinance did not leave alternatives open, 15 1 in addition to its other
shortcomings, the majority struck down the permitting scheme for its many con-
stitutional violations. 152 Forsyth resolved the tension which had resulted from
the Cox and Murdock decisions, and it provides the clearest description yet of
the standards for permitting. 153 Its decision also provides an outline of the con-
stitutional requirements for regulating a public forum.
154
D. Private Party Organizers in Public Fora
The above discussion focused on whether permitting systems put in
place by the government are constitutional, or whether they abridge a speaker's
right to assemble in a public forum. The question becomes more difficult, how-
ever, when two private parties each wish to have the same public forum space.
The following cases address when more than one private party wishes to engage
in expression in the same public forum space.
1. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of
Boston
In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered a landmark unanimous deci-
sion in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston
("GLIB"), when it held that a private party parade organizer did not have to
allow GLIB to march in its parade.1 55 In Hurley, GLIB wished to march in the
St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Parade, of which the South Boston Allied War
Veterans Council ("the Veterans Council") held the permit to organize. 156 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had found that the Veteran's Council
was required to admit GLIB, but on appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed,
finding instead that such mandatory inclusion violates the private organizer's
First Amendment expressive rights. 
157
The Court in Hurley opined that even though the Veteran's Council was
not very choosy in selecting most of its participants, "a private speaker does not
forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by
failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject
151 Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 130 (citing U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983), discussed supra
notes 55-60 and accompanying text).
152 Id. at 137.
153 Janiszewski, supra note 44, at 130.
154 Id.
155 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995).
156 Id. at 560-61.
157 Id. at 564-66. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated, in its holding, that be-
cause "it is impossible to discern any specific expressive purpose entitling the Parade to protection
under the First Amendment," the parade was not an exercise of the Veteran Council's First
Amendment rights entitling it to protection. Id. at 564.
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matter of the speech."'' 58 Further, the Court stated that every unit participating
will affect the message conveyed by the Veteran's Council, thus, the lower court
was essentially ordering the Veteran's Council to change the expressive content
of its parade. 59 Whatever the reason that GLIB was not welcome to participate
in the parade, the choice to select who can and cannot participate "[is] beyond
the government's power to control."
60
Hurley clarified that once a private organizer has a permit to assemble,
the organizer alone can decide who may participate, and can exclude others
even if the reason is discrimination based on sexual preference.1 61 Overall, gov-
ernment-compelled membership in a group can be voided if the inclusion would
alter the group's expressive message. 162
2. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
In a case following in the footsteps of Hurley, the U.S. Supreme Court
again affirmed the right of an association to pick and choose who associates
with it, even if a member is excluded due to his sexual affiliation. 163 In Boy
Scouts of America ("BSA") v. Dale ("the BSA Case"), the Court, in a 5-4 opin-
ion, held that because the BSA is a group engaging in "expressive association,"
forcing the BSA to include a member violates its rights because the inclusion
would alter the message that the BSA wished to express. 164 Because the BSA
believes that homosexuality is inconsistent with its values, the government may
not force the BSA to include a homosexual scout leader. 165 The Court stated
that "[a]n association must merely engage in expressive activity that could be
impaired in order to be entitled to protection."' 166 Thus, the law is not free to
interfere with speech "for no better reason than promoting an approved message
or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may
strike the government."'
167
The BSA Case depended largely on who held the discretion to deter-
mine the mission of an association or group.168 The Court ultimately held that
the association or group itself holds the discretion to determine its mission and
158 Id. at 569-70.
159 Id. at 572-73.
160 Id. at 575.
161 Janiszewski, supra note 44, at 133-34.
162 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sex, Money, and Groups: Free Speech and Association Decisions in
the October 1999 Term, 28 PEPP. L. REV 723, 738 (2001).
163 Boy Scouts of America (BSA) v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653-56 (2000).
164 Id. at 656.
165 Id. at 653-54.
166 Id. at 655.
167 Id. at 661 (citing Hurley v. GLIB, 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995)).
168 Sullivan, supra note 162, at 740.
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its members - not the government. 169 Both Hurley and the BSA Case are impor-
tant to adequately formulate criteria for West Virginia to use in public forum
cases involving political parties.
IV. CRITERIA FOR WEST VIRGINIA TO EVALUATE CONTENT-BASED
RESTRICTIONS AT POLITICAL RALLIES
If a case with a similar fact pattern to the Ranks' arrest at the Charleston
Independence Day Rally 170 were to come before the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, it is difficult to discern what controlling criteria exist when a
political party is the organizer of the assembly or event. A political party is an
association that is sometimes viewed as a private association, yet it is also
viewed as a governmental actor.' 7' The preceding cases 172 are helpful as a start-
ing point for the hypothetical West Virginia case, but foreign circuit and district
court precedent provide more narrow and analogous facts to help establish this
sought-after criteria. Case law exists in fellow circuits, which, combined with
the aforementioned case law and some notable district court decisions, may help
to establish criteria for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to adopt if
and when faced with such a situation.
A. Relevant West Virginia Precedent: UMWA Int'l Union v. Parsons
UMWA Int'l Union ("UMWA") v. Parsons provides a foundation for
Public Forum Doctrine in West Virginia, even though it was decided prior to
ISKON v. Lee, Forsyth, Hurley, and BSA. 7 3  In UMWA, the petitioners
(UMWA) wanted airtime on the Mountaineer Sports Network to express views
contrary to what coal association ads were already expressing on the network.
74
Respondents (Assistant Athletic Director of West Virginia University and the
West Virginia Board of Regents) had previously denied the UMWA's request,
and the UMWA brought action, arguing that it was entitled to time to express
contrary political views. 175 Relying on Public Forum Doctrine and the West
169 Id.
170 For a review of the facts, see discussion, supra Part I. A person convicted of trespass in
facts analogous to the Ranks' case could appeal his or her conviction to the Supreme Court of
Appeals.
171 Sullivan, supra note 162, at 741.
172 Particularly, see Cox, Murdock and Forsyth (cases where a government permitting system
is questioned), discussed supra Part III.B-D.
173 United Mine Workers of Am. Int'l Union (UMWA) v. Parsons, 305 S.E.2d 343 (W. Va.
1983).
174 Id. at 346.
175 Id. at 349 n.3.
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Virginia Constitution,17 6 the West Virginia Supreme Court agreed with the
UM WA. 
177
The Court began its public forum analysis by stating the recognized im-
portance of the public forum, and noting that "[c]entral to the doctrine is the
concept that access to public forums must be provided by government on an
equal basis."1 78 Further, the court declared that a university facility is a public
forum, specifically "a governmentally created specialized forum for the propa-
gation of information and knowledge."1 79 Even though much of the Court's
discussion centered on broadcast and media, 80 which is not relevant to this pub-
lic forum discussion, the Court did come to a conclusion that could be transcen-
dent into other cases with different fact patterns.'
8'
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals indicated that it did not
support the controversial holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lehman,'
82
which had limited the Public Forum Doctrine by upholding a rule prohibiting
political candidates from placing ads on city transportation.183  The Court also
stated that, in the present case, allowing airtime to only one side of the debate
was "[encouraging] monopolization of the special forum it has created, and ef-
fectively [is preventing] . . . the expression of new ideas and viewpoints."',
84
The Court held that MSN was required to afford the opposing side a "reasonable
opportunity for the balanced presentation of contrasting points of view," which
would benefit the listening audience and the public in general. 85 This case im-
plies that West Virginia recognizes a broad Public Forum Doctrine, and the ne-
cessity to protect the speaker's access to the forum regardless of the speaker's
stance on an issue.
86
B. Guidance from Fellow Circuit Courts
UMWA provides insight into West Virginia's interpretation of the Pub-
lic Forum Doctrine, but it is not sufficiently analogous to the proposed West
176 Id. at 354. Specifically, the Court relied on W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 3 and art. III, § 7. Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 350.
179 Id. at 351. Although this case was decided prior to ISKCON v. Lee, the way in which the
W. Va. Supreme Court describes a university as a legislature-created specialized forum implies
that it would fall into the Forsyth "designated" public forum category. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at
678-79.
180 UMWA, 305 S.E.2d at 352-53.
181 See id. at 343.
182 For a review of Lehman, see discussion supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
183 UMWA, 305 S.E.2d at 355 (citing Lehman, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)).
184 Id. at 355.
185 Id. at 354-55.
186 See id. at 349-56.
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Virginia hypothetical case. 8 7 To answer what standards should be used when a
political party acts as an organizer of an event in a traditional public forum, and
proceeds to exclude opposing viewpoints from its assembly, similarly situated
cases from fellow circuits provide more specific insight.1 88 The following dis-
cussion of foreign case law is on point for the proposed hypothetical case, and
helps suggest criteria for the West Virginia Supreme Court to use in the future.
1. The Sixth Circuit: Sistrunk and Bishop
In the Sixth Circuit, two relevant cases provide guidance to establish the
sought-after criteria. In Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, the plaintiff, with ticket
in hand, entered a rally for the then-President George H. Bush's reelection,
which was held on public property.18 9 The permit to hold the rally was issued to
the organization for the fee of one dollar, and the permit stated that the grounds
were limited to the members of the organization and their invitees.190 The plain-
tiff was asked to surrender a button she wore, which endorsed Bill Clinton for
President, and was told that she could not take such a display inside the rally. 191
The issue before the Sixth Circuit was whether the defendant permit-holder had
the right to exclude speech from its rally, which occurred on a public forum.'
92
The Sixth Circuit, relying on Hurley, found that groups obtaining per-
mits could not be compelled by the government to include persons displaying a
contrary message. 93  The Sixth Circuit stated that, similar to the situation in
Hurley, requiring the Bush Campaign to include displays advocating Clinton
would "alter the message the organizers sent to the media and other observers,"
even if there was no interference per se with the actual assembly. 94 Further, if
the plaintiff was upset that she could not display contrary messages, "[she]
could have held a pro-Clinton rally on another day .... 195
187 See generally UMWA, 305 S.E.2d 343. The West Virginia Supreme Court indirectly cate-
gorizes the Mountaineer Sports Network as a designated public forum, not a traditional public
forum. Id. at 394 (referring to the network as "a governmentally created specialized forum").
Also, the speech is not by a political party, who (as previously mentioned), are both private parties
and governmental actors. Our hypothetical deserves consideration of cases where political parties
obtain permits to hold assemblies on a traditional public forum.
188 See id. at 343.
189 Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 195 (6th Cir. 1996).
'90 id. at 196.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 195.
193 Id. at 198. The Sixth Circuit states that although Hurley does not control, the similarity of
facts it has with the present case make its holding applicable. Id. The Court stated: "A public
rally is speech to the same extent that a parade is speech." Id. at 199.
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In a strong dissent, Judge Spiegel found that the Sixth Circuit should
have looked to a previously formulated test to come to its decision. 196 In Bishop
v. Reagan-Bush '84, the plaintiffs tried to attend a political rally in support of
President Reagan, held in a public forum, carrying signs contrary to the Reagan
Administration. 97 The Sixth Circuit outlined step-by-step criteria in its per cu-
riam opinion to determine if the permit holder could exclude whom it wished.
198
First, a court is to determine what type of forum is involved: traditional public
forum, designated public forum, or non-public forum.199 Second, a court must
determine if the City can demote the public forum into a private forum. Third,
if the City has the power to demote the forum, a court must decide the questions
of state action and qualified immunity. 2°° Lastly, a court must decide if the limi-
tations are reasonable time, place, or manner regulations. 201
According to the dissent, the real question in Sistrunk is to what extent a
municipality controlling a traditional public forum can turn over that control to a
private group holding a permit.20 2 The dissent questioned the majority's use of
Hurley because Hurley involved a parade participant - not a person wishing to
be a member of an audience.20 3 "The folks along a parade route or in a public
square during a rally are the audience," and "[u]nlike the gay marchers, Ms.
Sistrunk did not seek to intrude upon the Committee's speech by participating in
the proceedings.,,204 Thus, according to the dissent, the District Court should
have determined whether the City had the authority to demote the status of the
forum into a private forum through the use of a permit, and the majority should
have distinguished Hurley as being a case about a participant's exclusion rather
205than an audience member's exclusion.
2. The D.C. Circuit: Mahoney v. Babbitt
Case law from the D.C. Circuit also lends criteria suggestions for the
hypothetical West Virginia case.2° In Mahoney v. Babbitt, a group opposing
abortions received a permit to assemble a demonstration along the inaugural
196 Id. at 202.
197 Bishop v. Reagan-Bush '84 Comm., No. 86-3287, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 6669, at "1-3 (6th
Cir. May 22, 1987).





203 Id. at 201.
204 Id.
205 See id. at 200-03.
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parade route for President Bill Clinton. °7 The City's permit regulation allowed
the Field Director to revoke a previously issued permit when "'[a] fully exe-
cuted prior application' . . . will authorize activities which do not 'reasonably
permit multiple occupancy' of the area covered by the permit. ' 20 8 After the
plaintiff organization's permit was revoked, it brought an action seeking injunc-
tive relief from a potential arrest if it proceeded with the demonstration. 2°9 The
pertinent issue in front of the D.C. Circuit Court was whether this regulation
was a wrongful content-based speech restriction.210
The D.C. Circuit Court found that the government was not entitled to
restrict the organizer's speech in this case.21" The Court distinguished Hurley on
two grounds: (1) The parade organizer in Hurley was a private group exercising
its First Amendment rights,21 2 and (2) Hurley involved demonstrators seeking
participation in the parade - this case did not involve the plaintiff organization
seeking to participate in the Inaugural Parade.213 After discussing the importance
of public fora, the Court stated that there is "no authority for the proposition that
the government may by fiat take a public forum out of the protection of the First
Amendment by behaving as if it were a private actor.' '214 After noting that the
inauguration of the nation's chief executive is "an event less private than almost
anything else conceivable," the Court found that the government offered no
compelling justification that its policy was narrowly tailored to reach a legiti-
mate end, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to interject their beliefs.21 5
3. The Ninth Circuit: Galvin v. Hay
The Ninth Circuit recently outlined the importance of a protestor's loca-
tion in its decision in Galvin v. Hay.216 While Galvin did not involve a political
rally, its opinion is relevant because it discusses the importance of the protestor
207 105 F.3d 1452, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
208 Id. at 1454 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 7.96 (g)(4)(iii)(A) (1996)) (alteration in original).
209 id.
210 Id. at 1455.
211 Id. at 1460.
212 In contrast, the Court states that in the present case, the First Amendment conduct is being
barred directly by the government, not by a private party wishing to assert its expressive rights.
Id. at 1456.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 1457. The Court states: "Neither will we permit the government to destroy the public
forum character of the sidewalks along Pennsylvania Avenue by the ipse dixit act of declaring
itself a permittee." Id. at 1458. The government's power over the property it controls is to keep it
"for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Id. (quoting U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-78
(1983)).
215 Id. at 1458-59.
216 374 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2004).
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217to demonstrate where the relevant audience is found. A group in Galvin
wished to secure a permit to hold a demonstration in a park.218 The permit au-
thorities in Galvin stated that they would not issue the permit unless the permit-
tee agreed that it would not engage in acts of civil disobedience. 219 The permit-
tee was asked to move to and stay in a designated First Amendment area, which
was 150 to 175 yards away from the organization's target audience.22°
The issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether conditioning the permit
was a narrowly tailored restriction, and further, whether requiring the organiza-
tion to remain in the First Amendment area was a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction. 22 1 The Ninth Circuit found that the conditional permit was
not narrowly tailored and that the location restriction on the demonstration was
unconstitutional.222 The Ninth Circuit provided illustrations showing the impor-
tance of individual choice of message and manner of expression and then stated
that "the First Amendment mandates that we presume the speakers, not the gov-
ernment, know best both what they want to say and how to say it."'223 Speakers
may ordinarily control the presentation of their message in a public forum, and,
the Ninth Circuit further declared, "there is a strong First Amendment interest in
protecting the right of citizens to gather in traditional public forum locations that
,,224are critical to the content of their message ....
4. The First Circuit: Black Tea Society
In another more recent decision, the First Circuit produced an opinion
relevant to the location of a speaker's message and pertinent to the 2004 presi-
dential election.225 The demonstrators in Black Tea Society v. City of Boston
challenged the zone erected at the DNC226 and wished for the zone to be modi-
fied so that the demonstrations would be closer to those attending the conven-
tion.227 The First Circuit was asked to determine if the government's regulation
217 Id. at 747-52.
218 Id. at 742. The group wishing to protest was Religious Witness with Homeless People
("RWHP"), and it was protesting the restoration of a park. Id. It wished for the park not to re-
store the park by tearing down former army housing units, but instead, sought for the Park Service
to convert these units to housing for the poor and homeless. Id.
219 Id. at 743.
220 Id.
221 See id.
222 Id. at 753.
223 Id. at 750 (citing Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 790-91 (1988)).
224 Id. at 752 (emphasis added).
225 See Black Tea Society v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
226 For a more thorough description of the designated demonstration zone, see supra notes 5-6
and accompanying text.
227 Black Tea Society, 378 F.3d at 10-11.
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was narrowly drawn, and if it was the best way to reach the City's interest.228
The First Circuit found that the security interests alleged by the City were
enough to justify the regulation, even though the expression was burdened.229
In coming to its conclusion, the First Circuit stated that "[t]he question
is not whether the government may make use of the past experience -it most
assuredly can- but the degree to which inferences drawn from past experience
are plausible., 230 The First Circuit found that in the present case, even though
the decision was a difficult one, the regulations were narrowly tailored because
of the realistic security concerns. 23' The demonstrators, according to the First
Circuit, were not constitutionally entitled to closer access to their intended audi-
ence.
2 32
C. Notable District Court Decisions: Schwitzgebel and Gathright
Two district court decisions are worth mention. In Schwitzgebel v. City
of Strongville, the plaintiffs attended the same rally at issue in Sistrunk.33 The
plaintiffs were arrested after they held up anti-Bush signs.234 Charges against
the plaintiffs were dropped, but the plaintiffs still brought an action claiming
that their First Amendment rights were violated.235 The District Court found
that the City had not violated the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs and
that the permit system was appropriate, leaving ample alternatives of communi-
cation open.236
In its analysis, the Court first declared that the City was not permitted to
demote the traditional public forum into a private forum merely by issuing a
permit and that the Commons remained a public forum during its use by the
237permittee. The next inquiry, according to the District Court, was whether the
228 Id. at 12.
229 Id. at 12-15.
230 Id. at 14. The City of Boston was justifying the zone by arguing that the elaborate security
measures were necessary in light of past experiences at the 2000 Democratic National Convention
in Los Angeles. Id. at 13. One group of protestors that the federal judge who upheld the zone was
particularly protecting against had been known to use "urine-filled squirt guns and sling shots."
J. M. Lawrence, Convention Countdown; Judge: Protestors Must be Penned in, BOSTON HERALD,
Jul. 23, 2004, at 6.
231 Black Tea Society, 378 F.3d at 13-14.
232 Id. at 14. The Court also found that the demonstrators were underestimating modem com-
munication; the Court was sure that the intended audience would get the demonstrators' message
through radio, TV, Internet, and other sources. Id.
233 Schwitzgebel v. City of Strongsville, 898 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1995). For a review of
Sistrunk, see discussion supra notes 189-205 and accompanying text.
234 Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1211. The signs related to the Bush administration's handling
of AIDS research and funding. Id.
235 Id. at 1211-13.
236 Id. at 1218.
237 Id. at 1216.
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permit system was narrowly tailored and left ample alternatives of communica-
tion open for the plaintiffs. 38 The District Court found that even though a per-
son with ideas opposed to the permittee's ideas has the right to express his or
her views, he or she does not have the right to do so in an area specifically set
aside for an event "where his intrusion would be an interference., 239 The Court
found that the permit system was narrowly tailored and that "[i]t is precisely the
avoidance of the cacophony which such action creates that is the constitutionally
allowed aim of the permit system.,
240
Another important District Court opinion comes from Gathright v. City
of Portland, where the District Court considered if a private permittee can
choose who can or cannot attend functions held at a public forum.241 The Dis-
trict Court in Gathright agreed with the defendants that permit holders can de-
termine the content of speech expressed at the event, but limited this right, stat-
ing, "this right does not extend to individuals who are not participants in the
event., 242 The District Court was careful to note that the expression the permit
issuers excluded was unrelated to the message of the event; the Court distin-
guished this from cases were there is an attempt to participate in the event, such
as "[displaying] a controversial button at a political rally. 243
D. Criteria for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
The Capitol Grounds in Charleston, West Virginia, is a traditional pub-
lic forum.244 The State Capitol has unquestionably "immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public," and "time out of mind" been used for assembly
245and communication by people of the State. The West Virginia State Govern-
ment and the City of Charleston have undoubtedly intended the forum to be
fully open for expression by the public, and it has traditionally been used as
such.2 6 The physical characteristics and uses of the Capitol grounds are also
compatible with expression and assemblies.247 Also, the permit system used by
the City of Charleston is facially constitutional, and satisfies the Forsyth crite-
238 Id. at 1217-18.
239 Id. at 1218 (citing Sanders v. U.S., 518 F. Supp. 728, 729-30 (D.D.C. 1981)).
240 Id. at 1219.
241 Gathright v. City of Portland, 315 F. Supp.2d 1099, 1101 (D.C. Or. 2004).
242 Id. at 1103.
243 Id. at 1104.
244 See generally Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939), discussed supra notes
23-38 and accompanying text; ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992), discussed supra notes 76-98
and accompanying text.
245 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16.
246 See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680; see also supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
247 See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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.24ria.248 If the area is a traditional public forum, and the licensing system of
Charleston is constitutional, the question for the West Virginia Supreme Court
is: To what extent can a permittee exclude a non-disruptive person/group with
contrary views from the audience of the permittee's ticketed event, held on a
traditional public forum?
The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that destroying the status of a
traditional public forum is "presumptively impermissible," and that transform-
ing its character is unacceptable unless through a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction.249 Based on its decision in UMWA, the West Virginia Su-
preme Court would agree with this notion.250 When a political party obtains a
permit to hold a rally at a traditional public forum, the party is simultaneously
acting as both a private party and as a governmental entity.21  Thus, an argu-
ment can be made that the political party should have the right to exclude those
that hold contrary viewpoints.252 Despite this, a stronger argument is apparent
that, in a traditional public forum (such as the steps of the State Capitol), a per-
son wishing to attend an event as a member of the audience, and not wishing to
actively participate in the event, should be allowed entry.253
By wearing a button or shirt advocating a political opponent or display-
ing a contrary viewpoint, the perspective audience member is not actively par-
ticipating in the event, nor is he or she interfering with the speaker's message.254
Also, it is unrealistic and unnecessarily burdensome to First Amendment privi-
248 To obtain a permit to use the West Virginia State Capitol grounds, the permittee requests a
form for use of the grounds from the governor's general services office. The permittee then sub-
mits the completed form, and it is reviewed. If the permit is approved, the permittee must pay a
fee for setup, cleanup, etc. Telephone Interview with the Office of the Governor, in Charleston,
W. Va. (Nov. 30, 2005). For discussion of the Forsyth criteria, see supra notes 138-54 and ac-
companying text.
249 U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1983). For discussion of Grace, see supra notes 55-60
and accompanying text.
250 In UMWA, the majority states
Since Hague, the [public forum] doctrine has become firmly established as an
important principle of constitutional law. It prohibits states from regulating
speech-related conduct on certain governmental property except through rea-
sonable, nondiscriminatory time, place, and manner regulations. Central to
the doctrine is the concept that access to public forums must be provided by
government on an equal basis.
UMWA v. Parsons, 305 S.E.2d 343, 350 (W. Va. 1983).
251 See Sullivan, supra note 162, at 741.
252 See generally Hurley v. GLIB, 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (2000); see also discussion supra notes 155-69 and accompanying text.
253 See Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 201 (6th Cir. 1996) (Spiegel, J., dissent-
ing) (applying the criteria of Bishop v. Reagan-Bush '84, No. 86-3287, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS
6669 (6th Cir. May 22, 1987)), discussed supra notes 189-205 and accompanying text; see also
Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 1452, 1456-59 (D.C. Cir. 1997), discussed supra notes 207-15 and
accompanying text.
254 See Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 201; see also Mahoney, 105 F.3d at 1456.
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leges to require all audience members wishing to display contrary views to each
obtain a permit for another day, in order to hold a 'rally' of their own.25 5 As the
dissent stated in Sistrunk, Hurley cannot be applied where the contrary-view
holder is not seeking participation in the event, but is instead just hoping to be
an audience member.256 Just as the Inaugural Parade of President Clinton was
viewed in Mahoney as "so public" that the government could not remove the
public forum from First Amendment protection, so are political rallies hosting
the nation's president (particularly when held on State Capitol steps). 7 Thus,
no compelling justification could be argued by the government to deny someone
wishing to display contrary views, so long as the person has a ticket to the per-
mitted event and is not seeking to interfere or actively participate in the event.258
Equally important is location - it is not appropriate to force those wish-
ing to display their viewpoint to maintain an unreasonable distance from their
intended audience. 259 Demanding a person who only wishes to be an audience
member, with ticket in hand, to choose between removing his or her opposing-
view items or stand in a designated free speech zone is unduly burdensome to
First Amendment privileges. 260 A city naturally has a strong and legitimate in-
terest in preserving safety for its citizens and in avoiding interference on behalf
of the permit holder.261 Yet, because adequate security checkpoints are in place,
and because there is a presumption that the speaker, not the government, knows
the best way and place to engage in his or her expression, mandating that a pas-
sive audience member remove opposing-view items or relocate to a demonstra-
262tion zone runs counter to traditional public forum principles.
If a case of this disposition were to come before the West Virginia Su-
preme Court, the Court would likely first recognize its dicta in UMWA, which
noted the importance in preserving traditional public fora.263 The Court should
then apply the above criteria, including the security risks of the particular event,
the intended participation by the person holding the contrary views (whether the
person is seeking to just be an audience member or to actually interfere), and the
relevance of the location of the person displaying the contrary-view items.
264
255 See Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 199. The majority's solution in Sistrunk was to have the pro-
Clinton button-wearer hold her own rally another day. Id.
256 Id. at 201.
257 See Mahoney, 105 F.3d at 1458-59.
258 See Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 201; Mahoney, 105 F.3d at 1456.
259 See Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 750-53 (9th Cir. 2004), discussed supra notes 216-24 and
accompanying text.
260 See id.
261 Black Tea Society v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 10-12 (1st Cir. 2004), discussed supra
notes 225-32 and accompanying text.
262 See Galvin, 374 F.3d at 750 (citing Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 790-91
(1988)).
263 See UMWA v. Parsons, 305 S.E.2d 343, 350 (W. Va. 1983); see also supra note 250.
264 For a review of all criteria, see discussion supra notes 244-62 and accompanying text.
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Applying the outlined criteria to the hypothetical case, First Amendment privi-
leges guarantee protection for the prospective audience member. The right to
attend the event undoubtedly trumps the permit holder's wishes to exclude any-
265one wearing opposing-view items.
V. CONCLUSION
While making his 2004 Independence Day speech in West Virginia,
President George W. Bush declared: "On this 4th of July, we confirm our love
of freedom, the freedom for people to speak their minds .... Free thought, free
expression, that's what we believe. 266 To protect our freedom of speech, crite-
ria must be adopted that work to preserve the characteristics of traditional public
267fora in West Virginia. When an event is held in a traditional public forum, a
non-participating audience member should be allowed entry despite garb. As
stated in fellow jurisdictions, a state can work towards maintaining a safe citi-
zenry, but cannot deny entry when someone does not desire to participate. A
lack of participation cannot alter the speaker's or permittee's intended message.
By adopting the criteria of fellow foreign courts, the West Virginia citizenry can
enjoy its right to freedom of expression. This right and the right of the State to
maintain a functional society can then exist in a harmonious balance.
Melissa M. Rounds*
265 Id.
266 Remarks on Independence Day in Charleston, West Virginia, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1202 (July 4, 2004). Jeffery and Nicole Rank, arrested for criminal trespass during this address by
the President, see supra Part I., have currently brought an action against the Deputy Assistant to
the President of the U.S., et al., in the Southern District of West Virginia for deprivation of their
Civil Rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rank v. Jenkins, No. 2:04cv997 (S.D. W. Va. filed
Sept. 14, 2004).
267 See discussion of suggested criteria, supra notes 244-65 and accompanying text.
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